Containing iran seems to have been the US's primary policy in the Middle East since it views the rash teocratic regime in Iran would apparently be deemedto pose serious threat to the US's very interests in the region. The regime change in Iran, the US urges, is the ultimate solution for a myriad problem of the Middle East. This perspective stems from its insistence that consolidation and progress will only derive from a unity. In order to unite all Middle East states under a single command, the US therefore has been applying harshretoric against Iran and pledging it the common enemy particularly of the region, and primary actor of world terrorisme. This persuasion is added several baseless accusations designating Iran responsible for Iraq and Afghanistan insurgency, a complicated Lebanon, Hamas extremism and Iran's bid for ascendancyto dominate over the region amounted to shift of balance of power to its favor. The bulk of these denunciations are further seemed to be more threatening to the regional and even international security because of its nuclear weapon projection regardless purposes it may have been built for. Whatever a peaceful aim is, the US insists, a nuclear proliferation attempted under a misleadership is dangerous and will only compromise the world's security. The US's provocation is accompanied by its building up a Naval Military presence in the Persian Gulf and providing a $75 Million for an envisioned regime change in Teheran. It has also been trying to utilize the International Institution of UN and persuading the Gulf States to rally their support of putting whatever pressure necessary to curbe Teheran. In so doing, the US provided a $20 Billion arms package to Saudi Arabia and Gulf Emirates thus enabling both to bemilitarily formiddable and commited to containing Teheran's influence. These steps are undertaken due to broad based expectation to reshape the socio-political set upof the region on the ease of the US and its indivisible partner Israel. The initiative then suggests the inception of sense of a common enemy on the mind of the Arab world againts Iran that may jeopardize their vulnerable security. The Shiite-led regime in Teheran, besides its nuclear capability, will instigate the Sunni Arab States to apparently temper their rival's behavior and limit its space of influence. Such figure is cultivated broadly and finally to generate the likely unity among Arab states to stand together against their common enemy (Iran), which it is so far not. Among consequences that the US hopes of this shift of Arab world's concentration, is that this unity will not only focus on a joint programme of military capability and defenses, but also a Middle East peace process with a more tolerant attitude of Palestinian leaders who may straightforwardly accept any proposals initiated by the US. This is important to show a bit explanation to comply with a presumably mischieveous move that the US has been so far conducting and a relatively wrong understanding of its present standing. The US seems failed to understand Iran insistence on its every action. It errs to equate Teheran with the collapsed Soviet Union which managed to globally expand its rule andinfluence all over the world, thus requiring its vast military capability of conquest which consequently implied a joint arrangement of broad based military deterrence by numerous countries led by the US.Soviet Union therefore has experienced the status of common enemy, at least againts the US and its allies. Teheran is by contrast not indicating any move of expanding its military superiority and or implementing any scriptural promises, but a quest to become a pivotal actor in the region, and a common enemy perception is nothing but merely of exageration. A provision of an attempted union of Gulf states is flawed because of the complexities the US has to figure out in Iraq.This newly restructured state may be of exception out of this union. This is clear since Saudi Arabia will never give its support to Shiite-controlled region of Iraq, it will only prefer the former's Sunni opponent instead.Meanwhile, the Iraqi Shiite leaders favor their Iranian counterparts and the US. This will of course leave the US's path to create a favorable Middle East landscape more complicated and make a nightmare of further Iraq's destabilisation as a front line to counter Iran come true. This unsound theory of Arab solidarity solidifies the US lack of ability to understand the diverse views of Arab states about Iran. Some states, like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, are worried of Iranian influence towards their internal affairs while other, like Egypt and Jordan, assure a probable Iranian interference and its growing power to erode both's standing in the region, especially issues related to Palestine. Unlike the above states, Qatar and United Arab Emirates enjoyed beneficial economic relationship with Iran dated since 1990s. This contradictory attitude stimulates a more difficult task of initiating arab unity on the shoulder of the US besides a wide spread anti-US sentiment all over region and also the world. Another fact revealing the likely failed US's contaiment policy is pointed out towards its assumption of shift of Middle East focus from Israel-Palestine-related issues to Iran. This assumption looks ridiculous for its uncertainty to find any practical endorsement. For many decades, the Arabs held that Israel-Palestine conflict remained the utmost strategic issue to be solved and therefore perceiving Israel more acute threat to their very security. Teheran's condemnation and denunciation against any Israel misbehavior and its support for HAMAS and Hizbullah reflect its attempts to win Arab states' favor. All these, added with anti-US sentiment professes the more firmly Iran's standing than the US's in the region. The mentioned is of merely least consideration that the US government will have to confront with weighted problems in its way to applycontainment policy against Iran. This proposition presumably shows how heavy the costs of burden the US is to bear. The US learnt nothing from precedence of waging war against Soviet-supported Afghanistanin 1979s. Such struggle of promoting democracy and capitalism to break illegitimate regime and diminish communist influence in Afghanistan finally endep up with the up coming of Islamic Radicalism now known as Taliban or Al-Qaeda.The same may reappear as if the US continues to pursue its policy to militarily deflate and attack Iran. The consequence is predictable, a possible Sunni extemism to come up. Does the US realise this and will it take this into account?Option is available to suggest a better attitude of the US to undertaking a more beneficial of some sort of regional cooperation with all entities including Iran herself. Would the US and Arab states sit on the table of consolidation, putting asideobsolete minds, the region might have been able to coordinate their destinations and cooperate to persuasively embrace their very interests. All are given ways to assure their intentions of applying certain international policies without invokingany misperception of others.
Tuesday, April 29, 2008
Iran; A common enemy?
Iran, A common enemy?
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